MBS Returns to Washington: Reassessing the Future of U.S.-Saudi Relations

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s anticipated return to Washington arrives at a moment of recalibration in one of the most consequential partnerships in the Middle East. For decades, U.S.-Saudi relations were treated as a predictable pillar of American strategy-anchored in oil, security cooperation, and shared interest in containing regional rivals. That foundation has been shaken by human rights controversies, the war in Yemen, the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and divergent approaches to Iran, global energy markets, and great‑power competition.

Today, as energy volatility, multipolar competition, and shifting regional alliances reshape the strategic map, both capitals are reassessing what they want from each other-and what they are willing to pay, politically and morally, to get it. Mohammed bin Salman’s visit is not simply a symbolic reset; it is a stress test of whether U.S.-Saudi interests can still converge in a way that is sustainable in Washington’s domestic politics and credible in Riyadh’s long-term vision.

The crown prince’s trip is also part of a broader Saudi effort to reposition the kingdom as a pivotal global actor: through Vision 2030 economic reforms, overtures toward normalization with Israel, active diplomacy from Sudan to Ukraine, and a more autonomous foreign policy that courts both Washington and Beijing. For U.S. officials, engaging MBS now means confronting an uncomfortable reality: values-based promises made on the campaign trail collide with the hard arithmetic of energy security, regional stability, and competition with China and Russia.

This article explores how Mohammed bin Salman’s visit could redefine the next phase of U.S.-Saudi relations-and what it implies for the future of American policy in the Middle East.

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MBS in Washington: A Stress Test of Biden’s Strategic Pragmatism

The Biden administration enters this visit under the shadow of its own earlier rhetoric. Pledges to treat Saudi Arabia as a “pariah” have gradually given way to a more cautious, transactional strategy that officials now describe as “managed differences.” In practice, this means that human rights issues-from the Khashoggi case to the imprisonment of activists-are largely pushed into private discussions while the public agenda centers on energy security, regional de‑escalation, and countering China.

This shift reflects a broader calculation inside the White House: sidelining Mohammed bin Salman now appears more costly than engaging him. Oil markets remain tight despite slowing global growth; maritime disruptions in the Red Sea, ongoing tensions in Gaza and Yemen, and simmering flashpoints with Iran all heighten the value of cooperation with Riyadh. At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s expanding ties with China-ranging from energy deals to defense and tech cooperation-have alerted Washington to the risk of strategic drift if the relationship is allowed to stagnate.

Yet this renewed engagement comes at a political price. Lawmakers and advocacy groups warn that normalizing relations without conditions could entrench authoritarian practices and weaken U.S. leverage on human rights and governance.

Behind the ceremonial images and official statements, U.S. officials are quietly evaluating a series of high-stakes trade-offs:

• Security assurances that deter Iran and reassure Gulf partners, but stop short of NATO-style automatic defense commitments.
• Energy coordination that encourages predictable Saudi oil output without appearing to capitulate to OPEC+ production decisions or undercutting climate goals.
• Human rights engagement largely confined to closed-door dialogue, in order to avoid derailing negotiations over defense, technology, and regional diplomacy.

The overarching question for the Biden team is how far it can stretch strategic pragmatism before it clashes with domestic political constraints and stated U.S. values.

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The Khashoggi Shadow: Human Rights and Accountability as Enduring Fault Lines

Despite efforts to move toward “future-focused” cooperation, the legacy of Jamal Khashoggi’s murder continues to define the optics-and substance-of high-level engagement with Riyadh. The U.S. intelligence community’s assessment that MBS approved the operation, the limited transparency of Saudi legal proceedings, and ongoing reports of repression inside the kingdom have made it difficult for Washington to fully turn the page.

The Biden administration has opted for a recalibration rather than an overt rupture: targeted sanctions on some individuals, rhetorical emphasis on human rights, but continued security and economic engagement. Yet this balancing act is under constant challenge from Congress, journalists, and human rights organizations, which argue that any durable reset requires measurable accountability and systemic reform.

Recurring demands in Washington policy debates include:

• Fuller declassification of intelligence related to Khashoggi and other high-profile abuses by security services.
• Targeted sanctions and visa restrictions on officials implicated in serious violations.
• Clear benchmarks for legal reform, including more transparent judicial procedures and safeguards for due process.
• Formal conditioning of certain arms sales and technology transfers on human rights improvements.

In parallel, the lens through which Saudi Arabia is viewed in Washington has widened. It is no longer framed solely as an oil producer or a bulwark against Iran. The human rights dimension is now central to how MBS is portrayed and how lawmakers justify support-or opposition-to deals involving the kingdom.

Civil society and advocacy groups emphasize unresolved concerns such as:

• Detention of peaceful activists and continued restrictions on speech, assembly, and association.
• Use of digital surveillance tools to monitor, intimidate, or target dissidents at home and abroad.
• Lack of transparency in politically sensitive trials, including terrorism and national security cases.
• Travel bans and family reprisals against relatives of exiled critics, which create a climate of transnational repression.

As global public opinion grows more attentive to human rights records-including in key U.S. allies-these unresolved issues persist as the most significant constraint on a full political rehabilitation of MBS in Washington.

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Energy Security and Defense Cooperation: Quietly Redefining Mutual Dependence

Global energy dynamics have changed dramatically over the last decade. The United States is now the world’s largest producer of both oil and natural gas, and renewable energy investment continues to accelerate. Yet Saudi Arabia remains central to global energy security: as of 2024, it still ranks among the top oil exporters and holds some of the world’s largest spare production capacity, giving it outsized influence over price stability.

Washington’s interest in Riyadh is therefore not about returning to a simplistic “oil for security” formula, but about crafting a more sophisticated, multi-layered relationship that blends energy coordination with defense and technology partnerships. For its part, Saudi Arabia is leveraging its energy clout and strategic geography to secure advanced military hardware, a more formal security framework, and recognition as a pivotal regional power.

Current U.S. priorities include:

• Stable oil supplies and predictable production policies to reduce vulnerability to price spikes and geopolitical shocks.
• Coordinated price management that limits Russia’s ability to exploit energy markets for political leverage, particularly in Europe.
• Protection of critical infrastructure and maritime routes-from the Gulf to the Red Sea-that underpin global trade and energy flows.

Saudi priorities, in turn, center on:

• Long-term security guarantees that deter regional adversaries and signal enduring U.S. commitment to the kingdom’s defense.
• Access to cutting-edge defense systems, including missile defense, advanced aircraft, and cyber capabilities.
• Recognition as a leading regional power with a seat at the table on issues from energy transition to conflict mediation.

Shared concerns-especially regarding Iran’s regional posture, potential disruptions in maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, and the vulnerability of energy infrastructure-are driving closer coordination on specific security tracks.

This quiet recalibration is unfolding with little public fanfare but profound implications for leverage on both sides. Washington recognizes that leaning too heavily on Saudi barrels complicates its climate commitments and credibility on human rights. Meanwhile, Riyadh understands that overdependence on emerging partnerships with China or Russia could expose it to new vulnerabilities, from technology dependence to sanctions risk.

The emerging model is not exclusivity, but redundancy:

• The United States is expanding domestic energy resilience, investing in renewables, and diversifying import routes even as it courts Saudi cooperation.
• Saudi Arabia is deepening economic and security links with Asian and European partners while maintaining core defense and intelligence ties with Washington.

The result is a more flexible, issue-specific alignment in which both sides aim to preserve a strategic compact centered on energy security and defense, but with greater room for maneuver and bargaining.

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A Values-Based Yet Interest-Driven Blueprint for Resetting U.S.-Saudi Relations

If Washington wants a sustainable framework with Riyadh, it must reconcile its strategic imperatives with a more credible commitment to values. That means moving beyond ad hoc crisis management toward a structured, rules-based relationship where deeper cooperation is explicitly tied to progress on human rights, governance, and transparency.

A pragmatic yet principled approach would rest on several pillars:

• Security & defense: Condition advanced arms sales and defense cooperation on written safeguards for minimizing civilian harm, transparent rules of engagement, and regular reviews of operational conduct.
• Energy & climate: Link long-term energy coordination to joint investments in renewable energy, carbon capture, and transparent emissions reporting in line with global climate goals.
• Technology & data: Require modern data protection laws, clear AI governance frameworks, and cybersecurity standards as prerequisites for expanded U.S. tech and digital infrastructure partnerships.
• Governance & rights: Establish quiet but firm benchmarks on due process, political detentions, and safeguards for peaceful dissent-verified by independent or multilateral reporting mechanisms.

These principles can be operationalized through institutional mechanisms rather than one-off political bargains:

• Embedding human rights metrics into bilateral working groups on security, justice, and digital policy.
• Synchronizing congressional oversight with executive branch negotiations, so conditions and expectations are transparent and consistent.
• Creating a standing review body to assess compliance before new initiatives in defense, energy, or technology are approved.

Incentives and consequences must be clearly paired. Expanded investment channels, diplomatic prestige, and deeper defense integration should be contingent on forward movement in agreed areas. Reversals-such as new waves of political detentions or documented abuses-should carry tangible costs, from delayed arms packages to limits on technology cooperation.

Such a framework would allow Washington and Riyadh to acknowledge persistent disagreements without veering into rupture. It would replace the old habit of trading silence on rights for short-term security gains with a more predictable, transparent bargain: cooperation in strategic domains in exchange for incremental but verifiable progress on governance and rule of law.

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Conclusion: A Relationship in Transition, Not in Freefall

Mohammed bin Salman’s return to Washington does not signal either a sudden collapse or an effortless revival of U.S.-Saudi relations. Instead, it underscores that the partnership is entering a more contested, complex phase. The classic oil-for-security bargain is now entangled with human rights debates, climate policy, the global race for critical technologies, and intensifying strategic competition with China and Russia.

For U.S. policymakers, the central challenge is to align long-standing strategic interests-energy stability, regional security, counterterrorism, and great‑power competition-with mounting domestic expectations for a foreign policy that visibly reflects American values. For Saudi Arabia, the test is whether it can secure the security guarantees, investment flows, and political legitimacy it seeks while asserting a more independent and sometimes divergent regional posture.

How Washington and Riyadh manage these tensions over the coming months and years will shape not just bilateral ties, but the broader architecture of security and diplomacy in the Middle East. What is clear is that neither country can afford to ignore the other. Yet both must accept that the old framework no longer functions on autopilot. The next chapter of U.S.-Saudi relations will be defined less by inherited assumptions and more by negotiated, conditional cooperation-where interests and values are in constant, and unavoidable, negotiation.